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Essays
New Historical Insights on the
Curious Case of Baird v. Eisenstadt
Roy Lucas*
From the shadowy, puritanical Victorian days of 1879, until
March 22, 1972, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts periodically
enforced an archaic law that initially defined its sweeping crime
as follows:
Whoever sells, lends, gives away, exhibits, or offers to
sell, lend or give away.., any drug, medicine, instrument
or article whatever for the prevention of conception.., or
advertises same, or writes, prints, or causes to be written
* Roy Lucas died on November 3, 2003, before the editorial process for
this essay had been completed. The essay, in edited form, is published with
the permission of Mr. Lucas's sister, Mary E. Lucas. The Law Review thanks
Ms. Lucas for her assistance.
Prior to his death, Roy Lucas was an independent research scholar in
Washington, D.C., involved since 2000 in researching the private papers of
Supreme Court Justices in the National Archives and the Manuscript Divi-
sion of the Library of Congress. He wrote the first article making a constitu-
tional right of privacy argument for abortion while a senior at New York
University School of Law in 1966-67. See Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional
Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Stat-
utes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730 (1968). While attending New York University School
of Law, Lucas was a member of the Law Review and Order of the Coif, was a
Root-Tilden Scholar, and was a Rotary Foundation Fellow in the United
Kingdom in 1965-66. Most notably, Lucas wrote parts of two briefs for Roe in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and one brief for Doe in Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973), and argued several cases before the United States Supreme
Court, including Baird v. Bellotti (I), 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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or printed a card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement
or notice of any kind stating when, where, how, of whom
or by what means such article can be purchased or ob-
tained, or manufactures or makes any such article shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not
more than five years .... 1
Thus, it was criminal in the Commonwealth to sell, give away,
loan, or show contraceptives such as condoms, IUDs, birth control
pills, and perhaps even rhythm charts. Any transmission of infor-
mation or means of contraception could come under the prohibi-
tion of the law. A user could be a felon as well, or an accessory, 2 or
perhaps a conspirator, 3 depending upon the creativity of the
prosecutor.
Any such transmission of contraceptive means or information
was initially a crime, whether done by a physician, druggist, or
professional teacher-lecturer.4 The same was true regardless of
whether the recipient was married, and irrespective of health or
even life concerns which necessitated such use. The 1879 Massa-
chusetts birth control ban, like that of the same year in Connecti-
cut, was total, and has a place of shame in legal history not unlike
a scarlet letter.5
Law students since the 1940s have studied the path of the
Massachusetts mini-Comstock law from its inception in 1879,6 the
1. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 21 (2000).
2. MASs. GEN. LAwS ch. 274, § 2 (2000) provides, "Whoever aids in the
commission of a felony, or is accessory thereto before the fact by counseling,
hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished
in the manner provided for the punishment of the principal felon." Id.
3. Conspiracy to commit a felony is only a misdemeanor. See Common-
wealth v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530 (1935). Nevertheless, the multiplication
of counts in a large enterprise can yield significant time. Section 2 defines ac-
cessory so broadly as to devour much of the conspiracy misdemeanor alto-
gether. See § 2; Commonwealth v. Stasuin, 349 Mass. 38 (1965).
4. The Massachusetts courts initially interpreted the statute quite liter-
ally. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938) (en-
forcing the Massachusetts statute against physician and director of clinic in
Salem). Two years later, the same court, in an embarrassed turnabout, al-
lowed registered pharmacists to sell contraceptives for the prevention of dis-
ease. Commonwealth v. Corbett, 29 N.E.2d 151, 153-54 (Mass. 1940).
5. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETrER (Harper
& Brothers, 1950) (1886).
6. See discussion of Anthony Comstock and "his law," infra note 20.
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failed challenges of 1938, 7 the successful "right of privacy" case of
Griswold v. Connecticut8 in 1965, Massachusetts amendments af-
ter Griswold,9 and Eisenstadt v. Baird in 1972.10 The Abortion
Cases of 1973 followed,1' and relied in significant part upon Baird
dictum cleverly inserted into the opinion by Justice Brennan.12
Today we can enrich these important historical studies with
newly available manuscript papers from the Library of Congress
and the National Archives. 13 These papers reveal the United
States Supreme Court's previously secret processes of deciding
cases defining American constitutional rights. They open up some
7. See Gardner, 15 N.E.2d at 222 (upholding Massachusetts birth con-
trol ban), appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 559 (1938) (per curiam).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. In 1966, post-Griswold, Massachusetts amended section 21 to create
a similar crime with regard to means and materials "intended to be used for
self-abuse," as well as informational material on abortion. MASS. GEN. LAws
ch. 272, § 21. The origin and enforcement of the "self abuse" clause is
shrouded in mystery. In addition, the legislature created section 21A to carve
out exemptions for registered physicians, pharmacists, and some few others
providing contraception services and information to married persons who
have prescriptions. MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 272, § 21A (2000). The unmarried
class had no such access or exemption. Id.
10. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
11. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
12. The ever-quoted phrase from Baird is: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 405 U.S. at 453.
The "bear or beget" terminology was not suggested as such in argument, the
briefs of the parties, or by amici curiae. It may have been derived from the
expression "to bear or not to bear" written back in 1966, and published in the
text accompanying footnote 125 of the law review article by Roy Lucas, Fed-
eral Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of
State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 761 (1968). The "beget" term is a
biblical translation removed from the text of the Dead Sea Scrolls.
13. The Library of Congress (LOC) and National Archives (NA) in Wash-
ington, D.C., have extensive manuscript and Supreme Court document hold-
ings, in several different locations, with treasures in abundance. The
Supreme Court itself has a fine law library, but does not match the LOC or
NA for in-depth research on historical manuscripts. Very often, the private
notes reveal explanatory thoughts and viewpoints that a Justice would never
have articulated in public including: the deciding of issues not briefed or ar-
gued, criticizing counsel or a lower court, relying on material not in evidence,
showing lack of knowledge of the record or legal issues in a case, exposing se-
rious bias, and bargaining ("accommodating") for votes to obtain a majority,
or switching viewpoints, even within a single case.
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of the reality behind the stately printed "opinions of the Court,"
which often are clerk-written, after-the-fact rationalizations,
drafted to reinforce the conclusions of our nine highest, secluded,
and secretive, black-robe-clad lawyer-judges.14 Research into these
papers is jurisprudential archaeology in the tradition of The
Brethren,15 Liberty and Sexuality,16 and Closed Chambers,17 ten-
fold.
14. Each Justice, of course, has a different learning and decisional proc-
ess. In every case, however, the practice is to vote in "Conference" the Thurs-
day or Friday after argument, then to assign, write, and circulate proposed
opinions. Occasionally, the briefs, records, and supporting materials are sim-
ply not studied by the Justice, or are even regarded with disdain. Lack of
depth in understanding background, facts, and issues is not uncommon. For
example, in Roe, Justice Blackmun cited the outdated lay book ABORTION
(1966), by writer-activist Lawrence Lader, instead of any number of scholarly
treatments on the shelves and in the briefs that had current material rele-
vant to the Roe/Doe cases. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130 n.9, 132 n.17, 133 n.21, 136
n.26, 139 n.33, 150 n.44, 161 nn.57-58. This was akin to citing The New York
Post instead of the Journal of the American Medical Association.
15. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (Avon Books
1981) (1979). This is one of the earlier modern-era books by non-lawyer jour-
nalists that utilizes conversations with Justices, law clerks, and others un-
known, to tell important and interesting inside stories.
16. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY (MacMillan 1998) (1994).
Garrow is almost encyclopedically thorough in his setting out of historical
private papers, interviews with law clerks, and private information from Jus-
tices, parties to litigation, counsel, families, friends, and foes. Any critical
analysis in Liberty and Sexuality is only diminished slightly by Garrow's
chronological twenty-year distance from the events and lack of training as a
lawyer, much less as a strategic federal appellate litigator. Three years of law
school and 3000 hours per year working at litigation make a Grand Canyon
chasm of difference in one's analysis of matters, as does a special and deep
involvement in the subject matter. Litigators tend to notice significant stra-
tegic material that is under the radar of political scientists, historians, and
other mortals who have never studied evidence or federal appellate practice,
or so much as scanned the federal judicial code. Justice Scalia made a par-
ticularly insightful observation on this point: "The first year of law school
makes an enormous impact upon the mind ... a sort of intellectual rebirth,
the acquisition of a whole new mode of perceiving and thinking." Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). (Note: Garrow was suspended
from his post at Emory in October 2002 after having been arrested on charges
of criminal battery upon a female university employee. See Arielle Kass, Pro-
fessor suspended after alleged assault: Garrow faces criminal charges; civil
suit expected, THE EMORY WHEEL, Oct. 25, 2002, www.emorywheel.com
/vnews/display.v/ART/2002/10/25/3db8b9b5d2e62. This may or may not affect
his authority as a scholar. In the present article, however, Garrow's infer-
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Before thesd last several years, scholars, lawyers, and stu-
dents had only the usual, published opinions of the court, copies of
briefs, joint appendices, and occasional law review articles to dis-
cern the Justices' decision-making processes. Those are often mere
surface imagery materials, frequently no more than camouflage.
The case method deals with after-the-fact rationalizations, not the
numerous, often subtle and extra-judicial persuasion factors that
go into a vote on a case. In this respect, much of our legal educa-
tion has been fundamentally flawed from the very outset. Law
clerks, not Justices, draft most opinions today, and have done so
since the time of Chief Justice Earl Warren. Yet students examine
Supreme Court opinions as if each word came from the Justices
with specific intent.
This Essay sets out and explains intriguing new documentary
material in the context of the rise and fall of the Massachusetts
birth control law, and the landmark Equal Protection case we
know as Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 or vice-versa. Chief Justice Burger
himself mixed up the names and parties in a private diatribe he
wrote against Sheriff Eisenstadt, intending to attack Mr. Baird. 19
As an incentive to continue carefully, you may expect to find that:
* Chief Justice Burger voted strongly against Baird ini-
tially. Finding himself alone, he hinted he would
switch and thus be able to assign the opinion away
from Justices Douglas or Brennan.
" Justices Douglas and Brennan countered by suggest-
ing that Brennan write a simple per curiam instead of
a full opinion, and thereby dispose of the case quickly
as if it were unimportant. Burger agreed because he
had determined never to assign important opinions to
the Warren Court "liberals," especially not Douglas,
Marshall, or Brennan.
ences and omissions with regard to Liberty and Sexuality were known and
examined on the merits many months before the arrest.)
17. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (Penguin Books 1999) (1998).
Closed Chambers is a first-rate early "law clerk" book by Justice Harry
Blackmun's 1988-89 law clerk.
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. See Appendix. Chief Justice Burger was alone in his diatribe and dis-
sent, and appeared not to have a full grasp of the broader issues in the case,
as shown in the Conference Notes and his undated handwritten memo set out
at the end of this Essay.
2003]
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" Justice Brennan promptly produced a full sixteen page
right of privacy opinion instead. He circulated it the
morning of the Roe v. Wade oral arguments, perhaps
expecting to influence the outcome and reasoning,
even to secure the Roe opinion assignment for himself.
* Justice Stewart insisted that Brennan remove from
the Baird draft opinion a paragraph condemning dis-
crimination against the poor.
" Justice Blackmun declined to join the Brennan privacy
opinion in Baird. Instead, he acquiesced in a concur-
ring opinion by Justice White which used a different
approach.
THE 1879 MASSACHUSETTS LAW
At the behest of legendary neo-puritan Anthony Comstock,20
Massachusetts passed the law in question in 1879. Comstock was
the well-known fundamentalist enthusiast who marshaled the
Comstock Act of 187321 through Congress, which banned the im-
portation or transportation in interstate commerce of matter per-
taining to abortion or contraception. He orchestrated the arrest of
over 3000 individuals, and was instrumental in the passage of
mini-Comstock laws in a number of states.22
20. The last remnants of Congressional and State "Comstockery" fell in
Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (New York ban on
mail order advertising of contraceptives unconstitutional), and Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (prohibition of mailing unsolicited
contraceptive advertising unconstitutional). Footnote 19 of Bolger well de-
scribes Comstock and his Act:
The driving force.., was Anthony Comstock, who in his diary re-
ferred to the 1873 Act as 'his law.' Comstock was a prominent
antivice crusader who believed that 'anything remotely touching
upon sex was.., obscene.' The original prohibition was recodified
and reenacted on a number of occasions, but its thrust remained the
same-'to prevent the mails from being used to corrupt the public
morals.' (citations omitted).
Id. at 71 n.19.
21. Ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000)).
22. The Connecticut statute struck down in Griswold, supra, is also from
1879, a prolific year for Mr. Comstock. The literature on other mini-Comstock
laws, birth control, morality, and Comstockery as a way of life is substantial.
See generally MARY WARE DENNETT, BIRTH CONTROL LAws (1926) (includes
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Massachusetts placed the statute in its lengthy Chapter 272,
"Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency, and Good Order."
The chapter has some 100 separate, often extraordinary offenses,
and a preoccupation with regulating anything and everything
sexual. As surely as the sun rises in the east, fornication has been
a dastardly crime throughout New England since the landing at
Plymouth Rock.23 Self-abuse is not a permissible privilege either.2
Contraception, of course, allows several certain sins to be free
from detection, and came under statutory condemnation in 1879.
CHALLENGES TO THE AFORESAID LAW
Often in the 1900s, birth control supporters beseeched the
Massachusetts legislature to change the 1879 law-always in
vain.25 Lobbyists for the tax-exempt Catholic Church just as often
suggested that they change nothing, or civilization might come to
an end, at least in New England. Liberty and Sexuality,26 the very
lengthy book by David Garrow, tells most of that story quite well
and in exquisite factual detail. I will not retrace that ground, ex-
cept to notice significant new insights. I will attempt to remain fo-
cused instead on strategy, policy, and the consequences of various
courses of action in the litigation process. I will suggest that with
an alternative strategy, Bill Baird would likely have obtained a
similarly favorable ruling much sooner and not done hard time in
the Charles Street jail over this Comstockian law. However, the
alternative course had a dangerous eighty-five-year-old pitfall of
the legislative history of the Comstock Act); C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLI-
TICS AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972); GARROW, supra note 16.
23. The first English criminal laws against fornication in the colonies
were likely those in 1612 from Lord De La Warr and the Jamestown Virginia
Council: the code "Lawes Divine, Morall and Martial." Premarital sexual ex-
perimentation was not uncommon in the Puritan world, according to the his-
torical record, but was punished whenever accusations were made. See
www.mayflowerfamilies.com/colonial-life/morality and-sex.htm, (listing a
number of convictions and punishments for premarital sex).
24. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 21.
25. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court chronicled the early leg-
islative and judicial activity on birth control in its opinion in Commonwealth
v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222, 223-24 (Mass. 1938). The Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors examined the legislative and case law activity on birth con-
trol for both States in State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 858-59 (Conn. 1940).
26. GARROW, supra note 16.
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its own, namely, the failing, but still influential, Justice Hugo
Black.27
A QUICK FAST FORWARD
One can quite adequately summarize the litigation history of
the 1879 Massachusetts law in the Supreme Court within a few
paragraphs. Thereafter, the new subchapters of this important
story may be told, without undue proliferation of citations and
footnotes, and endless deadly explanations of standing, jus tertii,
ripeness, privacy, penumbras, emanations, instruments, and the
like.
The initial Massachusetts foray to the U.S. Supreme Court
began with the appeal of Commonwealth v. Gardner.28 Gardner
originated as an undercover investigation and enthusiastic prose-
cution of a physician and the director of North Shore Mothers'
Health Office in Salem, which provided contraceptives, primarily
to married women.29 After this prosecution, and similar under-
cover operations in Brookline and Boston, every such clinic in the
Commonwealth closed.
In Gardner, the Commonwealth high court unanimously up-
held the convictions and rejected the plea to interpret that statute
to exempt physicians prescribing for the health, safety, and well
being of married patients. That court declined to make any excep-
tions whatsoever, and expressly rejected the approaches of the
New York federal and state courts, including the wisdom of
Learned and Augustus Hand.30 The Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
27. I am neither the first nor the last to suggest that Justice Black per-
haps should have left the Court when he started developing a mean streak
around 1965. By then he was 79. See generally DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING
THE BENCH 143 (1999); David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the US Su-
preme Court, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1050 (2000). The guardians of the Bill of
Rights and penumbras should always have their wits about them, or the citi-
zenry will suffer. Justices do have comfortable life pensions, but tend to hold
on to the reins of power, even after they cannot be trusted with the car keys.
28. 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938).
29. In earlier times, the arrestees might have been tried for witchcraft,
but Salem had progressed to a different felony for vocal "uppity" women who
defied the governing males.
30. See United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1936)
(Augustus Hand, J.); Youngs Rubber Co. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108-
10 (2d Cir. 1935) (Swan, J.).
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cial Court identified the legislative purpose as preventing "sexual
immorality."31 By common misunderstanding in Massachusetts,
that meant any non-procreative and probably non-missionary sex,
and in fact, perhaps any pleasurable form of sexual activity at all.
Dr. Gardner and the other defendants filed four separate ap-
peals to the U.S. Supreme Court on August 11, 1938.32 The late
Robert G. Dodge of Boston was lead counsel. The Commonwealth
of Massachusetts did not even file an opposition brief. None is in
the "Records and Briefs" for this case at the Library of Congress.33
The actual federal constitutional questions presented are not
clearly set out by the wordy Mr. Dodge, who was a "prominent"
Boston lawyer, meaning corporate and well-connected, but not
necessarily a skilled federal appellate litigator. The Statement as
to Jurisdiction for Dr. Carolyn T. Gardner, by today's standards,
reads like a repeatedly redundant general narrative written by a
state court litigator, who might have had difficulty finding a fed-
eral courthouse without a map and satellite guidance. There was
simply no clear identification of any federal constitutional "Ques-
tion Presented," or a plausible federal question raised. At most,
Mr. Dodge sets out his wording of this offer of proof: "It is sound
and generally accepted medical practice to prescribe contracep-
tives to protect life or health. Such practice has the backing of the
American Medical Association.... .,34
Counselor Dodge did identify his reliance generally upon the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but said noth-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause, which was to be by far the
strongest argument with Justice Black and company on the Court.
Equal protection of fundamental human rights became the win-
ning argument in Eisenstadt v. Baird,35 but 34 years would first
intervene.
Dodge did not explain what the American Medical Association
and "accepted medical practice" had to do with the Fourteenth
31. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d at 223.
32. Today and then, all could be combined into a single Jurisdictional
Statement to minimize redundancy, printing costs, court filing fees, and legal
fees. See SuP. CT. R. 12(4).
33. The entry in Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559, 559 (1938) (per
curiam), shows no appearance whatsoever for Commonwealth counsel.
34. Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction at 10, Gardner, 305 U.S. 559
(No. 264) (on file with Roger Williams University Law Review).
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Amendment. Certainly the Constitution is not synonymous with
evolving standards of acceptable medical practice, whatever that
means. He might have said that this factor tends to show the ab-
sence of a Commonwealth public health interest, but he did not.
The lengthy discussion of state court procedure, timing, record
keeping, and the like seem endlessly immaterial and may suggest
he was being paid by the word, or had nothing substantial to ar-
gue concerning the federal Constitution.36
The U.S. Supreme Court, without even requesting a response,
summarily and unanimously rejected the appeals on the second
Monday in October, the 10th, 1938. The per curiam memorandum
upheld the Massachusetts anti-birth control law on the merits.
The Court cited four earlier decisions deemed dispositive, as fol-
lows: 'The appeals herein are dismissed for the want of a substan-
tial federal question. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685
[1888]; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 [1905];
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 428 [1926]; Lambert v. Yellow-
ley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926)."37 Gardner thus became a unani-
mous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on the substance and
merits, upholding the Massachusetts mini-Comstock's total prohi-
bition on contraceptives, even as applied to a physician's ability to
prescribe contraceptives to patients for their health and well-
being, or to protect them from the serious hazards of childbirth,
including maternal mortality.
Gardner is not a technical or procedural dismissal, as shown
by the authorities it cited and the references to explanatory pages
36. Garrow inexplicably praises Dodge's legal work in Liberty and Sexu-
ality. GARROW, supra note 16, at 54. Katharine Hepburn, mother of the late
actress, and Connecticut birth control activist, dissented. She suggested in
jest she "might shoot" Dodge, but for the wrong reasons. Id. at 55. With hind-
sight, one sees the Dodge firm today simply as Boston "prestige" lawyers, who
lacked vision and analytical litigation skills in dealing with this cutting edge
federal constitutional material and practice. No matter how you view the
Gardner matter, Dodge made a woefully inadequate presentation of the con-
stitutional case. He did not develop the case law on constitutional rights and
he did not present any "Brandeis brief' kind of evidence on the birth control
problem, the ongoing work of the clinic and physicians, or the dire human cir-
cumstances of a sample of patients. These inadequacies have not been un-
common in the course of similar litigation. Both Ms. Sarah Weddington,
arguing for Roe in Roe v. Wade, and Ms. Margie Pitts Hames, arguing for Doe
in Doe v. Bolton, put on no medical evidence whatever at trial, called no wit-
nesses, and had minimal federal litigation experience.
37. Gardner, 305 U.S. at 559.
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within those decisions. The disposition of Gardner was the highest
degree of utter and total rejection that the Court could bestow on
the Birth Control League of Massachusetts (BCLM), an early ver-
sion of Planned Parenthood.
At the time, the Supreme Court consisted of Chief Justice
Charles Evan Hughes, and Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, But-
ler, Stone, Roberts, Black and Reed. Not one voiced a dissent. The
result was the equivalent of finishing the Boston Marathon after
dark, the next day, and being cited for loitering during the race.
The Court, in Gardner, was quite evidently sending a very strong
message that a state's power over health and morals allowed it to
ban outright all sale and prescription of contraceptives, even by
physicians for the most serious of life and health reasons. Abortion
would have been even less favored.
As to the four cases cited, Powell upheld 8-1 a dairy-
protectionist statute that criminalized the sale of oleomargarine, 38
an insulting fifty year-old precedent to throw at Mr. Dodge, and a
laughable outcome as seen from a 2003 perspective in light of "I
Can't Believe It's Not Butter!." Jacobson sensibly upheld a com-
pulsory vaccination-against-smallpox law, 7-2, using an urgent
public health need rationale.39 (Smallpox, however, received two
votes, and contraceptives, none!) Graves unanimously upheld a
state dentistry requirement of a diploma as a prerequisite for tak-
ing the licensure exam.40 Yellowley upheld 5-4 the 1926 Prohibi-
tion Act provision that a physician could prescribe only one pint of
liquor for medicinal purposes within any ten day period, 41 a prac-
tice that the American Medical Association said was without any
"scientific basis,"42 as even Chivas Regal cured nothing and was
an acquired taste.
The inadequacy of the Court's knowledge of the subject mat-
ter was appalling, and the citation to the pre-science oleomarga-
rine case of 1888 was embarrassing. The Gardner outcome was
retrogressive, even in 1938. The Court was in the midst of a larger
dispute over its power to strike down state and federal legislation
38. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
39. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
40. 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
41. 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
42. Id. at 590-91.
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generally,43 but that was no excuse for inadequate performance on
an issue of such magnitude as human birth control laws and pub-
lic health. The Court, however, may not have wanted to enter the
altogether new (to the Court) arena of birth control with powerful
and vocal forces on both sides, not the least of which was the Ro-
man Catholic Church. The Justices, at their advanced ages, also
might not have identified with the problem of sexual urgency that
creates an unwanted infant year after year. Viagra was not even a
twinkle in the eyes of Pfizer at the time. The need for Chivas dur-
ing Prohibition, by contrast, brought in four votes. Chivas 4, con-
doms and diaphragms 0. Even smallpox received two votes. What
could the Justices have been thinking?
Tileston v. Ullman44 next visited the marble halls of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's newly reconstituted Supreme Court. Dr. Tile-
ston, with no patient plaintiffs, challenged the Connecticut mini-
Comstock law in state court, with his "prominent" Connecticut
lawyers. In an unsigned per curiam opinion, however, a unani-
mous Supreme Court dismissed the case, saying that Dr. Tileston
had neglected to spell out in his complaint that his rights, not just
those of his patients, were being injured by the 1879 Connecticut
law.45 The claims had been added in the subsequent binding stipu-
lation just a few pages over in the record. The Supreme Court dis-
regarded those. The Justices thought the case contrived.
The New York lawyering on appeal in Tileston was also less
than outstanding. The dismissive, two-page per curiam Tileston
opinion alone makes that clear. Counsel altogether failed to utilize
a powerful 1942 Equal Protection precedent that might have car-
ried the day, Skinner v. Oklahoma.4 The utility of Skinner is clear
from the fact that the Justices often cited it years later in the
Griswold-Baird-Roe series.47
43. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174-75
(4th ed. 2001).
44. 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 45.
46. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
47. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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POST-TILESTON
Massachusetts's reformers launched no serious judicial chal-
lenges to speak of in the 1940s and 50s. The Connecticut Planned
Parenthood committees could not agree on a litigation strategy for
another fifteen years, until May 1958. Then they filed a new chal-
lenge, Poe v. Ullman, again in state and not federal court, with pa-
tients as co-plaintiffs.48 The U.S. Supreme Court once more
ultimately dismissed the eventual appeal by a single vote, finding
5-4 that the Connecticut law was not seriously being used to
prosecute those plaintiffs; ergo there was no case or controversy.49
A surprising swing vote was Justice Brennan.
Poe is one of those opinions that law students routinely evis-
cerate in Constitutional Law 101 as poorly reasoned, insensitive,
abdicatory, and worse than cheap white wine with rare, aged Cha-
teaubriand. Planned Parenthood responded this time at more than
a glacial pace, and helped arrange for a Yale physician and
Planned Parenthood director to be criminally prosecuted and fined
a small sum, so that the law could perhaps be heard on the mer-
its.50
In June 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut5l
found 7-2 that the law was unconstitutional and violated a mari-
tal right of privacy, but the rambling opinion by Justice Douglas
diminished his credibility. The Ninth Amendment treatment by
Justice Goldberg, however, became a jurisprudential landmark for
that neglected article of the Constitution.
Griswold's right of marital privacy in 1965 was better than
never or none. However, the Court could have done the same in
48. The addition of plaintiffs Poe and others was designed to meet the
technicalities expressed eighteen years earlier in Tileston, so that the Court
might move on to other technicalities. Eighteen years is perhaps the Ameri-
can record for the time required for lawyers to amend a complaint, to add and
rearrange a few words and sentences. There were, however, mitigating cir-
cumstances, perhaps. Large numbers of vocal individuals and committees in-
sisted on being consulted. If anyone in the process had expertise and
experience in affirmative federal court litigation, he or she remained well
hidden.
49. 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961).
50. Prosecution of physicians had not been an easy option in Massachu-
setts because the crime was a felony there with potential serious prison time,
and consequences for a physician's license.
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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1938 or 1943, or found an implicit constitutional right to protect
one's life and health, or concluded that the Massachusetts and
Connecticut statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.52 During those intervening years, there
might have been great progress in the realms of population and
family planning. If, in 1938 or 1943, five Justices had so much as
comprehended the world population and human birth control
problems, been sensitive to the health interests of women, faced
the substance of the cases, and found the embarrassing mini-
Comstock laws to be unconstitutional, then legal scholars and law
students might have respected the Court more highly, instead of
considering Gardner, Tileston and Poe to be relics of insensitivity
to modem American life and constitutional development. The ret-
rogressive trilogy of Gardner, Tileston, and Poe unnecessarily
blocked world progress in many areas for twenty years and more.
THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY, LIFE, AND HEALTH
Constitutional scholars debated the notion of a constitutional
right of privacy well before Griswold, Baird, Roe, and Doe.53 The
1992 case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,54 supplanted the focus on
privacy with the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" concept. Yet
even Casey is poised precariously, existing as the law of the land
only as long as it can enlist a majority, which may be for months,
years, or decades. 55 Life, death, and viewpoints on the Court are
52. The Justices used that approach in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and others have argued well
that abortion and birth control fit also into an Equal Protection framework.
See, e.g., Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985).
53. Innumerable privacy-related articles and books are cited throughout
the 1998 paperback edition of Liberty and Sexuality, a veritable academic
treatise on privacy. GARROw, supra note 16.
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct 2472
(2003), surely strengthens Casey.
55. Casey was a fragmented split decision with a three-Justice plurality
that could hold, or not, or be altered, after a series of unpredictable new ap-
pointments. Historically, Republican presidents have appointed a number of
conservatives who put on the robes and became at least partial humanitari-
ans: Earl Warren, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy come to mind. Garrow boldly
states: "Casey resolved the basic constitutional question of abortion for all
time. The Court has made crystal clear that after Casey, there is simply no
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no more reliable than those who occupy the seats, and for however
long. Four Justices-Warren, Fortas, Harlan, and Black-left the
Court in close proximity in 1969-1970.
While Roe is one of the landmark cases of the 20th century, it
is also often and heavily criticized. Detractors point to the unenu-
merated nature of the privacy right, the badly handled oral argu-
ments on both sides, the disputed decision to reargue, and the
legislative nature of the opinion, just to mention a few. Justice
Blackmun himself, presenter of the opinion of the Court, was most
dissatisfied with much of the process. As The Brethren noted,
"Blackmun's tone was hostile throughout. Overall, he had found
the quality of oral argument in these cases poor. The abortion is-
sue deserved a better presentation."56 A poorly argued case may be
considered weak precedent.
The right to health care without discrimination or undue gov-
ernment interference is an additional constitutional framework
that might have been more solid than privacy.57 A right to improve
one's health without undue government interference is textually
closer to the Fourteenth Amendment than privacy or personal
autonomy. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Health and good health care are a
going back." Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical
Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 845 (1999). That is sadly and absolutely in-
correct in history, practice, and reality. The only barrier to overruling Roe is
two raw votes. If you replace Justice Stevens, then Justice O'Connor and/or
Kennedy with Scalia and Thomas followers, then Roe and Doe will become
overruled history. Then, chaos theory comes into play state by state. Con-
gress might attempt to impose various national restrictions on travel for
abortion and circumstances of the procedure. There is absolutely no binding
force that compels a new Justice to vote a particular way as to Roe. Nominees
to the Court routinely spin their views on possible issues that might come be-
fore them. Nothing binds them to future votes, except their own inclinations
and reasoning.
56. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 167 (Avon
Books 1981) (concerning the oral argument in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
on December 13, 1971).
57. "Privacy" brings to mind secrecy and the "hiding" of contraband or
criminal behavior, whereas "health" is a positive goal to extend the quality of
life. "Life" is textually protected in the Fourteenth Amendment, with "health"
as a component in any analysis. Poor health may shorten life substantially.
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fundamental necessity for a normal-to-better "life," and a quality
lifespan.
I personally briefed this "right to health care" issue in United
States v. Vuitch,58 in my American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) Brief in Doe v. Bolton, in the brief for Jane
Roe in Roe v. Wade, and in several lower federal and state court
cases. 59 These all were before the briefing and argument of Eisen-
stadt v. Baird. The Roe section on "health" argued as follows:
A. The Right to Seek and Receive Medical Care for the
Protection of Health and Well-Being is a Fundamental
Personal Liberty Recognized by Decisions of This Court
and by International and National Understanding.
The personal right to care for and protect one's health
in the manner one deems best has been honored by legis-
latures, except as to measures necessary to check wide-
spread disease and except for the intrusion of restrictive
contraception, abortion and sterilization laws.
Although this court has not expressly delineated a right
to seek health care, the importance of such care has been
recognized and the existence of such a right suggested. In
United States v. Vuitch, this Court reaffirmed society's
expectation that patients receive "such treatment as is
necessary to preserve their health." In this Court's invali-
dation of Connecticut's proscription against contracep-
tion, Justice White noted that statute's intrusion upon
"access to medical assistance.., in respect to proper
methods of birth control."
Finally, policy statements of national, and
international organizations indicate a pervasive
recognition of the right to seek health care. For example,
58. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
59. Examples of lower federal court cases for which I briefed the right to
health care issue include: Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972) (three-judge court);
and Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (three-judge
court).
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the right to seek health care. For example, the Constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization provides: "The en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of health is
one of the fundamental rights of every human being
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, eco-
nomic or social condition."
Congress, in passing the Comprehensive Health Plan-
ning Act of 1966, took a similar position: "[T]he fulfill-
ment of our national purpose depends on promoting and
assuring the highest level of health attainable for every
person, in an environment which contributes positively to
healthful individual and family living .... (footnotes and
citations omitted)."60
The point was not stressed in oral argument.
THE FEDERAL COURT ALTERNATIVES IN MASSACHUSETTS
Why did Bill Baird not start in the first place in federal court,
with judges protected from religious and political pressure by life
tenure? Federal civil test cases to protect constitutional rights un-
der the Bill of Rights were nothing novel when Bill Baird was ar-
rested in 1967. They went back to the post-Civil War era and the
federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Today, such § 1983 cases are commonplace. Highly suc-
cessful early examples had been Truax v. Raich,61 Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,62 Terrace v. Thompson, 3 and West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.64 Such affirmative federal cases were sta-
ples in the legal strategy of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
NAACP, but not Planned Parenthood. The Witnesses had the
skilled counsel of one Hayden Covington, a quite talented New
York federal litigator who traversed the nation protecting the
60. Brief for Appellants, Roe (No. 70-18).
61. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
62. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
63. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
64. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2003]
26 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.9:9
Witnesses' right to distribute pamphlets promoting their funda-
mentalist beliefs.65
A favorable federal district judge might have heard a Massa-
chusetts birth control case alone, if Baird had filed a classic de-
claratory judgment action.66 Or the district judge might have
requested that the chief judge of the circuit convene a three-judge
federal court, if the Massachusetts birth control law had been
challenged and an injunction sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit included at the
time Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich, Frank Coffin, and Edward
McEntee. Aldrich, a Harvard classmate of both Blackmun and
Brennan, was a liberal intellectual. He was the federal judge who
ultimately freed Baird on bail. Aldrich wrote a strong 1971 opin-
ion in Baird's favor.67 Success in federal court without being jailed
was frankly a highly probable outcome, if only legal talent had
been available.
I discussed this with Bill Baird in 2001. He had been of the
viewpoint in 1967 that public opinion about birth control would
sway the Massachusetts state courts favorably. Before the arrest,
he had not mapped out a defense or litigation plan with any legal
counsel. He thought that the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) would defend him well and successfully, but he had not
discussed that with the ACLU. However, considering the exten-
sive planning of Planned Parenthood's legal counsel, and the uni-
formly horrendous outcomes that followed such planning
(Gardner, Tileston, and Poe, as well as Sturgis), there simply may
65. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
for instance, was a straightforward three-judge federal court constitutional
case, directly appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court, developed
strategically almost twenty-five years before the Baird arrest.
66. The respectable federal Second Circuit in New York to the immediate
south had extensive experience in contraceptive legal issues, having decided
United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (Augustus Hand, J.)
and Youngs Rubber Co. v. C.L Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1935) (Swan,
J.). One Package sanctioned "the importation, sale, or carriage by mail of
things which might intelligently be employed by conscientious and competent
physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the well being of their
patients." Id. at 739. The Massachusetts law was anything but intelligent
and conscientious. It punished both physician and patient in a highly
discriminatory way, and on top of that, it was a felony.
67. See Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970), vacating 310
F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
NEW HISTORICAL INSIGHTS
have been a vacuum of federal civil liberties litigation legal talent
in Boston as to the potential legal questions involved in this kind
of case. Perhaps the confrontational style of Baird perturbed the
usual straight-laced Boston civil liberties bar, if there was one. In
any event, Baird fortuitously wound up with landmark decisions
in 1971 and 1972 with no early legal strategy and a last minute
switch of counsel in the Supreme Court. Credit for those creative
decisions goes primarily to Baird who set up the opportunity,
Judge Aldrich who wrote the First Circuit opinion, and Justice
Brennan who wrote and engineered the almost unanimous Su-
preme Court opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, just in time for the
Abortion Cases of 1973.68
IF BAIRD V. MASSACHUSETTS HAD BEEN LITIGATED DIFFERENTLY IN
1967
A Boston federal three-judge court route would probably have
produced the same or a very similar favorable outcome in Massa-
chusetts at or about the end of 1967, or beginning of 1968, since
Baird had been active in April 1967. Baird could have joined stu-
dents or a student group as co-plaintiffs making First Amend-
ment, privacy, and Equal Protection claims. The result would not
necessarily have been the same for a 1968 appeal to the Supreme
Court as in 1967, however, because the Court composition was
markedly different.
Strong-willed and stubborn Justice Hugo Black at age 82 in
1968 would have been the most formidable obstacle for Baird's
counsel to overcome. Black may have brought with him the vote of
malleable patrician Potter Stewart. This had been the case with
the Griswold decision in June 1965, where only Black and Stewart
dissented. Chief Justice Earl Warren was on the Court until June
1969, so Warren Burger was no factor at all. The Chief and Justice
Harlan may or may not have favored the Baird claims in 1968.69
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
69. Justice Harlan had written an important separate opinion in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and agreed with
the outcome in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring), but those cases were about married couples using
contraceptives. Justice Harlan himself in Poe stated:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual
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Justice Thurgood Marshall, who had replaced Justice Tom Clark,
was a likely favorable humane visionary vote in 1968. Justice Abe
Fortas remained on the Court until May of 1969, and was both a
strong privacy advocate 70 and the author of Epperson v. Arkan-
sas,71 which settled the case or controversy problems left over by
Poe v. Ullman. Epperson was precedent for suing without having
to be arrested.
The most probable vote stacked up as 7-2 in Bill Baird's favor
in 1968, or 6-3 if the appeal went over into 1969 when Warren
Burger would have arrived on the scene as Chief Justice. The Bos-
ton Vice & Morals Squad attending his lecture however, had dif-
ferent plans for Bill Baird. They arrested and cuffed him as a
prospective felon, and took him into the Massachusetts criminal
law and court system.
BAIRD IN THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMONWEALTH COURTS
The 1967 charges against Baird were twofold: (1) "unlawfully
giving away a certain medicine and article for the prevention of
conception" and (2) "unlawfully exhibiting certain articles for the
prevention of conception."72 The Boston trial judge found Baird
guilty on all counts, and reported the case to the Supreme Judicial
Court,73 which set argument for December 2, 1968.
powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which chil-
dren are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery,
fornication and homosexual practices which express the negative of
the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pat-
tern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
367 U.S. at 546. Hence, in 1968, the claims of unmarried persons might or
might not have come within the constitutional protection Justice Harlan had
to offer. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 313-314 (1992).
But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down
a Texas statute outlawing sexual relations between unmarried, same-sex per-
sons).
70. Justice Fortas, joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Clark,
had written an able dissenting opinion extolling the virtues of privacy in
Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411-20 (1967). The extent of his strong views
on privacy is explored in LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 263-67
(1990).
71. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
72. 247 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1969).
73. Id. at 575.
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The opinion of the aging conservative court in Commonwealth
v. Baird is not altogether an unsympathetic one. The court under-
stood that the incident was planned and occurred during "a lec-
ture to students in an auditorium of an educational institution. 74
Baird had been invited to address "a group of approximately 2,000
students in Hayden Auditorium at Boston University on April 6,
1967." 75 The one hour lecture was described as informative and
comprehensive. 76 At the end, Bill Baird invited the students to
help themselves to various non-prescription, over-the-counter con-
traceptive samples, namely Emko foam, which he brought along to
illustrate the lecture. He did not encourage or advocate, much less
incite any student to take samples and use them.77 He did not do
anything that might be construed as practicing medicine or phar-
macy.
Seven police officers and detectives came up to the stage. One
arrested Baird. The officers did not even have the initiative to
take the identities, age, or marital status of any of the student
witnesses. From a prosecutorial standpoint, the officers and detec-
tives did little to develop any kind of case at that time or later.
They simply loitered, ogling coeds. They then took Baird in for
processing as a felonious perpetrator against the morals and order
of the Commonwealth.
The Boston University incident exacerbated relations between
Baird and the local Planned Parenthood and ACLU. Those organi-
zations, however, had made little progress in the 94 years since
the enactment of the mini-Comstock law in 1873. Together, all
they had achieved was to lose a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court
decision. Both in Massachusetts and Connecticut, the Planned
Parenthood organizations had considered birth control reform
their private domain, although they could achieve little reform.
Their committee-planned lawsuits went down in flames, even
though they used "prominent" lawyers. The ACLU was relatively




77. Id. More interesting details appear in GARROW, supra note 16, at 320-
23, and accompanying notes. Apparently the chair of the Commonwealth
Senate Public Health Committee, William X. Wall, had called for Baird's ar-
rest. Id. at 321.
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seemed to issue policy statements and hold endless committee
meetings rather than planning creative federal or state court liti-
gation.78 Baird's vocal pro-active work rattled the cages of these
more conservative groups. He was actually doing something, and
it looked like it might work. His being male, too, may have ignited
the fires of reverse sexism among the emerging feminists. Planned
Parenthood and the ACLU distanced themselves from Baird. They
variously criticized or ignored Baird, then filed briefs on his side
in the higher courts, wrote papers about his case, and cited the de-
cisions in his case in their briefs and articles.7 9 Perhaps Baird was
simply taking a viable course in the tradition of Martin Luther
King, Jr., or even Galileo.
Meanwhile, the Massachusetts high court ruled for Baird on
the charge of "exhibiting" contraceptives. The court stated, 'The
display of those articles was essential to a graphic representation
of his subject."80
On the charge of giving away the over-the-counter Emko, the
Massachusetts court ruled this "added nothing to the understand-
ing of the lecture, and was not an exercise of a right guaranteed
under the First Amendment."8' The Massachusetts justices must
have been living in an era before the handout of package inserts,
articles, samples, and other teaching materials. On this point the
court was arguably wrong. Baird's handouts were not that differ-
ent from giving out the labels or package inserts of the articles,
because Baird did nothing to encourage or incite use. Looking at a
can of sample foam is a very far cry from using it. The seven loi-
tering police produced no evidence at all that any person even
thought about using a sample, as opposed to studying the contents
or seeking a physician's advice. They do make good paperweights!
The Massachusetts court, however, upheld the distribution charge
78. Coincidentally at the time, April 1967, as a senior at NYU Law
School one month from graduation, I had completed and published a note
that involved a comprehensive study of American birth control and abortion
laws. This included extensive study of Planned Parenthood and ACLU poli-
cies and activities. The article discussed affirmative preemptive declaratory
federal litigation. Lucas, supra note 12.
79. Both the Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and the Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts filed friend of the court briefs in Common-
wealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1969).
80. Id. at 578.
81. Id.
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in part because Baird was not a pharmacist or physician, and be-
cause the foam, in its view, was a contraceptive only.82 Baird was
at risk of up to five years in prison for his lecture sample.
The court further suggested that Baird should have tested the
law by bringing a declaratory judgment proceeding.83 The "open
challenge" and "public attention" bothered the court. Perhaps,
however, the court was annoyed at being the instrument of possi-
ble ridicule for upholding such an irrational statute. That was not
Baird's fault. Criticism of courts and judges is a legitimate form of
free expression that contributes to public understanding.
THE UNTIMELY APPEAL OF BAIRD V. MASSACHUSETTS
Baird next attempted to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court by
filing a typewritten in forma pauperis petition for writ of certio-
rari. The Court formally denied certiorari on January 12, 1970,
with only Justice Douglas dissenting.84 This refusal to hear was
unexpected. Baird was a very important case involving the appli-
cation of Griswold to unmarried persons in the context of a non-
physician giving an informative lecture.
The mystery remained hidden in the private papers of the
Justices until recently. A note from a law clerk to Justice Douglas
in the later Eisenstadt v. Baird manuscript files states: "Last term
the case was one day nonjurisdictionally out of time and dead-
listed, you voting to grant." 5 This suggests that counsel for Baird
82. Id. at 579.
83. Following the Baird decision, a group of Boston Planned Parenthood-
approved ob/gyn physicians took the court up on its seeming invitation to
contest the remaining law in a declaratory judgment proceeding. By an even
stronger vote and opinion, the Massachusetts high court rebuffed them as
well in Sturgis v. Attorney General, 260 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1970).
84. 396 U.S. 1029 (1970) (Misc. No. 707).
85. Clerk's memorandum to Justice William 0. Douglas regarding Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, (No. 70-17) (Dec. 30, 1970) (copy on file with the Roger Wil-
liams University Law Review, original on file with Justice William 0.
Douglas Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Madison
Building, Washington, D.C.). Chief Justice Burger, who was hostile to Baird
for unknown reasons, had "deadlisted" the Baird case. "Deadlisting" means
no discussion as a possible petition for certiorari to grant and hear, no discus-
sion at all, unless specifically requested by a Justice. Burger did not need to
do this. As Chief, he could list the case for discussion, and for a vote on
whether to be heard. To remove a case for discussion requires initiative from
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filed the petition for certiorari one day late, but the Court might
still have discretion to hear it, if four Justices wanted to do so.
None but Douglas did.
The issue of timing is straightforward. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decision was May 1, 1969.86 Thirty days
remained in May, thirty in June, and thirty in July. The petition
for certiorari was thus due in 90 days, namely on or before July
30, 1969. It was filed on July 31, one day late, and was not resur-
rected. While the petition was sent by special delivery, a time
stamp shows that it arrived late. The United States Postal Service
failed Baird, and the Justices refused to remedy the delay.
So, on January 12, 1970, the Supreme Court sent the Baird
case back to Boston. The Charles Street jail waited. No one in-
formed Bill Baird of the background of this denial and error until I
showed him the Douglas note in November 2001 from the Na-
tional Archives. No one seems to have noticed the reason for the
Supreme Court's initial denial of certiorari for all of these thirty-
three years, not even Garrow. The lesson is to file only printed pe-
titions for certiorari, and to be careful to do so several days ahead
of time, at the latest. Do not count on special delivery. It may have
been special, but it was late!
THE ENCOUNTER WITH JUDGE ANTHONY JULIAN
Baird had been sentenced to three months jail time following
the affirmance of his conviction. His time was up when the Su-
preme Court declined to hear his untimely petition for review.
Baird's only hope for release or liberty was to seek a federal writ
of habeas corpus declaring the conviction unconstitutional. He
filed such a petition in Boston federal court. He drew at random
from six possibilities the elderly, very Catholic district judge An-
thony Julian, who denied bail. On March 20, 1970, Judge Julian
upheld the conviction and the constitutionality of the Massachu-
setts law, in a fairly lengthy opinion that followed the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 7 Julian completely rejected
other Justices. Only Douglas wanted to grant review, and he was lukewarm.
Unlike several other Justices, Douglas operated in a world of his own and did
not lobby his colleagues to hear cases.
86. Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574 (Mass. 1969).
87. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970).
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Baird's First Amendment free expression claims,88 as did all
judges hearing the case aside from Justice William 0. Douglas. In
truth, Douglas just may have been more nearly correct than any of
the others. The strength of Baird's free speech argument comes
from the educational lecture after which Baird offered the Emko
foam for people to read the label and take or return. There was no
encouragement or incitement to use. The recipient could simply
read the label, go to a physician, or go to a movie, and use the can
as a paperweight or memento.
The judicial opinions in the course of this litigation do not
show that Baird submitted any package inserts, medical articles,
testimony from medical expert witnesses, or FDA material about
the safety of Emko foam. Those materials may have helped him in
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, as icing on the cake.
Some of those materials were available by walking into a drug-
store. Judge Julian used this deficiency of evidence as one of many
grounds for ruling against Baird.8 9 And so it was that Bill Baird
took up temporary residence in the notorious Charles Street Jail,
while his unpaid counsel scrambled to appeal and seek his release
in the interim.
RESCUE BY THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
The Baird federal appeal was promptly set before Chief Judge
Bailey Aldrich and Circuit Judges Coffin of Maine and McEntee of
Boston. They ordered that Baird be released on bail,90 although he
had already settled in and become familiar with the insects and
small rodents of the Charles Street detention facility.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
heard Baird v. Eisenstadt on June 4, 1970 and efficiently decided
the case in a four-page opinion released July 6, 1970.91 The rocket
88. Id. at 955.
89. Id. at 954 n.4.
90. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1399 (1st Cir. 1970). This decision
became a very useful precedent for both its lucid articulation of privacy rights
and post-conviction bail in controversial habeas corpus cases. It has saved
many a reformer from unnecessary incarceration pending appeal. Later in
1970 I used this case to prevent the detention of one Dr. Milan Vuitch who
was unjustly sought on illegal abortion charges in Maryland. See Vuitch v.
Hardy, 473 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
91. 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
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pace from the Supreme Court refusal-to-hear on January 12, 1970
to a full court of appeals decision July 6, 1970 is nothing short of
amazing.
Initially, Judge Aldrich rejected out of hand the First
Amendment arguments of Baird for "symbolic speech" because
acts beyond speech were involved.92 That analysis was too abbre-
viated and dismissively conclusory, but the court moved on to rule
in Baird's favor.
Aldrich next identified the reasons Massachusetts proffered
for the law against giving away contraceptives: "health and mor-
als."93 The Commonwealth asserted that contraceptives had to be
carefully controlled and access limited because of health issues.
Further, Massachusetts insisted that it could criminalize transfers
of contraceptives altogether to unmarried persons, and that it had
the power "to enact statutes regulating the private sexual lives of
single persons."94 The court of appeals found the Commonwealth
position "arbitrary and discriminatory" because of "the statute's
total exclusion of the unmarried, and because of its palpable over-
breadth with respect to the married."95
Additionally, the court held specifically that Baird had stand-
ing to sue although he was neither a physician nor a pharmacist.
Standing followed from the mere circumstance of Baird being
criminally prosecuted.96 The Massachusetts high court itself had
recognized standing by suggesting that Baird might instead have
brought a declaratory judgment proceeding.97
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts promptly appealed the
court of appeals' judgment to the Supreme Court. It timely filed its
papers as No. 70-17, Eisenstadt v. Baird. In sequence, this was
just before Roe v. Wade, which became No. 70-18, which I had per-
sonally filed in the Supreme Court, probably the same day.98 If
92. Id. at 1399.
93. Id. at 1400.
94. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965)).
95. Id.
96. This conclusion followed for the time being only because Judge Al-
drich said so.
97. Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 580 (Mass. 1969).
98. I had been asked to and had solely prepared the Jurisdictional
Statement in Roe. The Texas counsel had never before handled a federal case
and did not know where to appeal. I personally walked this one to the clerk's
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Baird v. Eisenstadt had been appealed later in the day, or the fol-
lowing day, after Roe, it might have been held over for the deci-
sions in the earlier relevant privacy cases, and may not have been
argued at all!99 Instead, by synchronism, Baird became a very
forceful supporting precedent for Roe, Doe, and a host of pri-
vacy/Equal Protection cases in the decades since.
The Supreme Court, of course, agreed to hear the appeal in
Baird v. Eisenstadt, and set November 17, 1971 for oral argument.
The Court later set December 13, 1971, for oral argument of Roe v.
Wade, No. 70-18, and Doe v. Bolton, No. 70-40. Notably, the only
female lawyer on the Baird appeal was a Massachusetts assistant
attorney general, supporting the mini-Comstock law. All too often
the demons against equal female rights are, yes, female; they may
be the designated foes, or misdirected allies mounting dangerous
friendly fire.
Although Bill Baird and the Planned Parenthood-ACLU lead-
ership would never be affectionate friends, both Planned Parent-
hood and the ACLU filed friend of the court briefs on behalf of the
important issues in his case.
Bill Baird determined late in the process to have former De-
mocratic U.S. Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland present the
oral argument, as opposed to Joseph Balliro or Chester Paris of
Boston. The latter two had been representing him for no compen-
sation throughout most of the preceding four-plus years.1°° Baird
had been persuaded that Tydings had special expertise, from his
work as a Senator, on family planning and population issues, so
Tydings would argue, and he would do well.
office at the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., to minimize any problems
or possible errors, and to meet the Clerk and his colleagues.
99. Whenever an earlier case involves similar subject matter, the Court
often holds all later cases without argument until the first is decided. While
Roe and Doe were pending, the Court held on the docket a considerable num-
ber of appeals related to abortion and privacy, from all over the United
States. These are scattered in the U.S. Reports following Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973).
100. Paris had successfully argued in the U.S. Court of Appeals, although
Judge Aldrich always had a totally independent mind of his own in deciding
cases, regardless of input from mere mortal counsel. Aldrich considered him-
self an eminent Harvard intellectual, scholar, civil libertarian, and judge,
with whom I basically agree, most of the time.
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ARGUMENT: NOVEMBER 17 AND 18, 1971
I was in Washington, D.C. for this argument and spent sev-
eral hours the day before and morning of the Baird hearing con-
ducting some final research, probably on the last-minute pre-
emption question raised by Tydings in the supplemental brief.101
While I would not be participating in the argument of Baird, Roe,
or Doe, I was handling a number of federal and state cases na-
tionwide that could be assisted or totally lost depending upon the
Baird/Roe/Doe arguments and outcomes. The Baird appeal was a
winning case and future precedent, barring some unpredictable
catastrophic occurrence. Roe and Doe were less predictable and
not in the best of hands for oral argument. 102 A disaster in
Roe/Doe, moreover, could leak back into Baird v. Eisenstadt since
the arguments both concerned privacy, and were less than one
month apart. 0 3
Joseph Nolan opened at 2:26 p.m. with oral argument for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 104 Nolan admitted at the outset
to Chief Justice Burger that "the record does not indicate nor did
the Commonwealth... introduce evidence tending to show that
101. The Tydings Supplemental Brief at __, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), (70-17), (available in the Library of Congress Law Library). (Edi-
tor's note: Due to the author's death, this source could not be located and
verified prior to publication). Tydings essentially argued that the Family
Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(a)-
(c), 3505(a)-(c) (1994), and other federal family planning laws, preempted the
Massachusetts law. Federal law supported the provision of contraceptives for
all Americans, regardless of marital status. That was a sound argument in
light of precedent, and could not have been raised below because the federal
statutes were new.
102. The number of knowledgeable observers critical of the inadequacy of
the oral arguments in Roe/Doe is substantial, including the Chief Justice and
Justice Blackmun. See supra notes 36, 68 and accompanying text. No Justice
has suggested that he was helped in any way by the oral presentations. Jus-
tice Powell's biography does not even devote a line to the oral arguments in
the lengthy chapter concerning abortion. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR: A BIOGRAPHY 332-70 (Fordham 2001) (1994). Black-
mun's law clerk, Ed Lazarus, personally described the arguments as "notably
unenlightening." LAZARUS, supra note 17, at 349. Similarly, Garrow enumer-
ates other published remarks mentioning the arguments as "not well ar-
gued," "less than stellar," and "more like a lobbyist." GARROW, supra note 16,
at 897 n.71.
103. Baird was November 17 and 18. Roe/Doe were December 13, 1971.
104. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (No. 70-17).
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[the person taking the Emko foam] was unmarried." 10 5 In truth,
the Commonwealth did not even prove that she was a she, nor her
identity, nor her intent in looking at the can of Emko foam, nor
what, if anything, was said when, or even if, the can passed
hands. Perhaps she thought it would make a good paperweight or
a simple souvenir. So much for charging Baird with giving away a
contraceptive to an unmarried person. The Court would decide the
issue anyhow.
Nolan quickly objected to Baird's standing to challenge the
law that had jailed him. 0 6 Justices Brennan and White both came
back with the observation that surely Baird must have standing to
challenge the very law that put him away. That was the basis for
standing in the court of appeals decision. Even the Massachusetts
courts had not denied Baird standing.
One Justice raised the interesting hypothetical whether the
Commonwealth could make it a crime for a non-physician to hand
"wheat germ" to a person. 0 7 The suggestion here was that the
Commonwealth had some responsibility to show that the banned
substance was harmful. Nolan sidestepped, observing that some
contraceptives have dangerous side effects. He made no such
claim as to Emko foam, and the Commonwealth had presented no
evidence whatsoever to that effect. Since Emko foam was available
over the counter and was non-prescriptive according to the FDA,
the Commonwealth was in trouble on this point.
Nolan knew he was being battered, and moved on to argue
that the Court should not act as a "super legislature" and should
not decide these policy issues. 08 He thought the legislature alone
held that power, and could support the statute as a morals law as
well. Then Nolan blurted out that "it's also against the natural
law."10 9 Whose "natural law," and where is it codified, the Court
might have asked, but Nolan was finished.
Chief Justice Burger appeared to be the sole tentative sup-
porter for Nolan, and at the end suggested that the "strongest
point" for the Commonwealth was that the law could "protect peo-
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 11. The transcript does not always identify the questioner, di-
rectly or indirectly.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id.
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ple from harmful substances at the hands of non-physicians." 110
Nolan sat down. Burger was only one vote. No other Justice
seemed to be leaning toward the Commonwealth.
Senator Joseph Tydings then began his argument for affir-
mance of Baird's victory by referring to "the dissenting opinion in
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court."' However, there
were two such opinions. 12 Tydings was caught not knowing that,
or to which he might prefer to focus his attention." 3 Both were
well written.
Tydings might have started out more strongly by attacking
the irrational features of the law, and the nonsense that there was
any public health reason to require Emko foam to be dispensed as
if it were a prescription drug. (He did that well, but much later in
the argument, which continued the following day.) Emko was an
over-the-counter product. Anyone could buy it and pass it on to
anyone else, except in Massachusetts.
So, Tydings shifted over to standing, which he might have by-
passed entirely as well-covered in the brief. He noted that the
Commonwealth courts had accorded standing to Baird, and that a
person in jail under a law surely ought to have standing to chal-
lenge it."1 No Justice reacted, as the issue had been exhausted fa-
vorably fifteen minutes earlier.
Then Tydings turned to his pet federal preemption argument,
which urged that three separate acts of Congress on family plan-
ning clinics and population together preempted the field, hence
Massachusetts could not enforce a restriction contrary to the fed-
eral clinic program.15 He should have underscored that federal
clinic workers were at risk of going to jail if they adhered to the
110. Id. at 21.
111. Id. at 22.
112. Justices Whittemore and Cutter had filed a dissenting opinion to-
gether, favoring Baird. Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 580-81
(Mass. 1969). They were prepared to find the "giving away" provision of § 21
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 580. They also found no further existing ra-
tional basis on which to sustain the statute. Id. at 581. Justice Spiegel had
filed a dissenting opinion in favor of Baird. He too found the law arbitrary
and capricious. Id. at 582.
113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (No. 70-17).
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id. at 23-24.
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letter and purpose of the federal family planning programs in
Massachusetts.
Justice Brennan interrupted, curious as to why he did not yet
have a copy of Tyding's supplemental brief on federal preemp-
tion.116 That late brief had been filed only two weeks before. The
point had not been considered or ruled on in the lower courts, and
the Commonwealth had not even replied to the brief. Justice
White was also interested in the preemption argument, but Ty-
dings had to concede that the federal acts did not specifically ad-
dress the question of non-physician provision of non-prescriptive
contraceptives. 117 He did observe astutely that "you just can't pos-
sibly afford to have a doctor in every clinic."118
Tydings next moved on to the "right to health" argument,
stating: "The right to make a decision to protect one's life, or to
protect one's health is a fundamental personal constitutional
right, within the penumbra certainly of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and the Ninth Amendment... ."119 No Justice chal-
lenged him.
Tydings moved further to "show some of the absurdities and
contradictions which put it [the law] clearly beyond any justifica-
tion, either as a health statute or a moral statute."120 Justice
Brennan inserted: "I take it that that's the ground the Court of
Appeals took?"121 Such was indeed the case.122
The Justices were basically listening to and not interrupting
Tydings. Again he noted that in the case of a woman who could
not afford a doctor's office visit to obtain a prescription for a con-
traceptive, the statute "cuts off any opportunity for her to protect
her own health."123
The Court adjourned for Wednesday, and returned at 10 a.m.
the next day. Tydings continued. He started with the poignant ex-
ample of the fact that a new bride could not obtain contraceptives
in Massachusetts until after the wedding ceremony, so "she
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at 26.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id. at 28.
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dashes from the church to the gynecologist to the drugstore and
back to the wedding reception."124 Justice Stewart inquired
whether adultery was a crime in Massachusetts and, if so, what
the penalty might be. Tydings did not know.125 The final opinion of
the Court made no reference to that sub-issue.
Tydings summed up concisely and did not even use up all of
his time. He described the law as "an outdated anachronism from
a Comstockian statute back in the 1870's, which has no business
being on the statute books today." 26 He identified the core of his
constitutional argument as "the dignity and the personality of the
individual... the very right to life and health."127 Then he poked
both feet in his mouth, continuing, "not only of the individual
mother herself but to the possible unborn child that she may have
or she may have some day."128 Somehow Tydings, in the pressure
of the Court environment, became totally mixed up. He should
have argued that contraception now protects a woman's health for
the future, when and if she wants a child or further children.
POST-ARGUMENT ACTIVITY IN THE SUPREME COURT
An amusing incident happened after all of the arguments
were done the second day. The Justices were leaving the court-
room through the curtains behind them. A large, plump, ruddy-
faced man from the audience stood up, huffed and puffed, and ad-
vanced toward the bench and Chief Justice Burger. He did not
shout, but said twice in a loud voice "I want to address the Court!"
There was silence in the chamber. If anything, the Justices who
124. Id. at 33.
125. Id. at 34. Today, this information is available quickly from the Inter-
net. Chapter 272 § 14, Adultery, provides:
A married person who has sexual intercourse with a person not his
spouse or an unmarried person who has sexual intercourse with a
married person shall be guilty of adultery and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than three years or in
jail for not more than two years or by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars.
Massachusetts General Laws at http://www.state.ma.us/legis/laws/mgl/272-
14.htm.
126. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (No. 70-17).
127. Id. at 39-40.
128. Id. at 40.
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even looked back appeared bemused. They knew what was com-
ing. Instantaneously, a dozen burly U.S. Marshals converged upon
the man. They lifted him horizontally into the air, and quickly
transported him from the courtroom toward the public hallway. A
bone cracked in there somewhere. I watched all of this from
scarcely ten feet away, amazed. The tight security and metal de-
tectors ruled out any concern for weapons. The huge detail of U.S.
Marshals eliminated any serious issue of physical threats. Neither
I nor Bill Baird ever learned the identity or purpose of the red-
faced mystery man, though it seems likely that he was someone
who hoped to persuade the Court to preserve Massachusetts' ban
on birth control. In this field it is grand to see opponents behave
like idiots.
The Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan manuscript papers in
the Library of Congress archives tell us what next occurred With
Eisenstadt v. Baird.129 The Conference discussion on the case fol-
lowed on the morning of Friday, November 19, 1971.130 Chief Jus-
tice Burger opened the Baird case discussion indicating his
intention to reverse the first circuit and uphold the Massachusetts
statute. He summarized his view stating: "this is like cigarettes -
a vendor's license is needed."131 As we shall see, there is no evi-
dence anywhere that Burger had studied the briefs, the record, or
any of the lower court opinions. The other Justices simply ignored
him in such situations.
Next, the most senior Justice, William 0. Douglas, voted for
Baird. He found the case to be a straightforward First Amend-
ment matter and Baird's handing out of a can of Emko foam to
view was a legitimate part and extension of the educational lec-
129. A recent book edited by Del Dickson includes and paraphrases these
as well. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 803-04 (1940-1985) (Del
Dickson ed., 2001). The original documents may be viewed under tightly con-
trolled circumstances in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. In or-
der to do so, one registers, secures any necessary extra permissions, then
studies the registries of documents in a Justice's collection, sends for those
container boxes and files of interest, and reviews them in a designated space
under many watchful eyes and cameras. I carefully studied the Douglas notes
on the conference, as well as some by Justice Brennan.
130. Conference notes, Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-17)
(published in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 129).
131. Id.
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ture.132 Potter Stewart found the statute to be "completely irra-
tional."133 He supported Justice Brennan (who shortly would be
writing the plurality opinion for the Court) and his view that "this
is in the penumbra of Griswold."134 Justice White initially stated
that he was inclined to rule against Baird and reverse, because
Baird was not a doctor as the statute required. 135 As to the belated
argument by Senator Tydings that federal law might preempt the
Massachusetts restrictions, White thought there "might be some-
thing to [it]."136 White eventually wrote a concurring opinion favor-
ing Baird, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun who soon was to
be writing the opinions in the Abortion Cases of 1973.137
The unwillingness of Blackmun to support Brennan on pri-
vacy at this point, and even later, is enigmatic. Blackmun's physi-
cian-oriented focus may have been the cause, or the fact that
Brennan and Douglas represented the old Earl Warren Court.
Nonetheless, the Blackmun vote for Baird in concurrence with
Justice White was an important one, and a deliberate break with
Chief Justice Burger.
The Conference discussion made it clear that by November 19,
1971 Baird had prevailed, at least 5-2, but he would not know it
until publication of the decision four months later on March 22,
1972. A memorandum in the Douglas archives dated November
23, 1971, indicates that Justice Brennan had initially agreed to
prepare a per curiam opinion, because the views of the Justices
had been so diverse.138 The reality is more complex. Chief Justice
Burger, on November 23, stated in a letter to both Douglas and
Brennan, "My vote is a questionable reverse with a note 'could af-






137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
138. Note from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger (Nov. 23, 1971) (on file with Roger Williams University Law Review and
available at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division).
139. Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice William 0. Doug-
las (Nov. 23, 1971) (on file with Roger Williams University Law Review and
available at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division).
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Justice Brennan wasted no time. He was already far ahead of
the pack. Brennan was ever the chess grandmaster.
DECEMBER 13, 1971 - BRENNAN DRAFT AND ROE V. WADE ARGUMENT
No brief per curiam draft opinion emerged from the Brennan
chambers. Instead, on December 13, 1971, the date of the Roe/Doe
oral argument, Justice Brennan circulated a printed sixteen-page
draft of a full opinion on the Baird merits. This contained his
soon-to-be-famous "bear or beget" language that linked contracep-
tion and abortion as part of the overall phenomenon of human re-
production.140 The ever-quoted sentence from Baird is: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."141
This phrase appeared near the end of the Baird draft opinions
from December 13, 1971.142 No Justice objected to the expression,
and all understood the content and purpose. The phrase has since
been quoted literally hundreds of times since 1972 in federal 43
and state'" court decisions and scholarly articles from one end of
the United States to the other, and not infrequently by the
Planned Parenthood critics of Baird who had failed in the same
mission for over 90 years before Baird came along.145
The timing and content were a work of superior intellect and
strategy and helped rescue the Roe/Doe cases that had been ar-
gued in such painfully mediocre fashion by the Texas and Georgia
lawyers that very morning. The entire Court now had before it a
140. "Eisenstadt provided the ideal opportunity to build a rhetorical bridge
between the right to use contraception and the abortion issue pending in
Roe." LAZARUS, supra note 17 at 365.
141. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
142. First draft of Supreme Court Opinion at 15, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-17). (on file with Roger Williams University Law Re-
view. It is also on file at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.)
143. The Shepard's citator sets show that Baird has been cited as author-
ity by each and every one of the eleven U.S. Circuits.
144. Shepard's also reveals that Baird has been cited by the highest courts
of all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
145. Shepard's also lists over three entire columns of law review articles
that have cited the Baird decision.
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high-quality privacy and Equal Protection opinion to study before
any vote at all on Roe/Doe.
THE NINE LONELY DRAFT OPINIONS OF JUSTICE DOUGLAS
Justice Douglas saw the Baird case as a matter of free speech,
plain and simple. 146 The Douglas archives show some nine drafts
of his opinion which he developed and circulated among the other
Justices. 147 No other Justice joined Douglas in his persistent First
Amendment analysis. The Douglas Baird opinion had the virtue of
being one of the most articulate ever by any member of the Court
on speech-plus. 148 The core of the Douglas position was this:
"Baird gave an hour's lecture on birth control and as an aid to un-
derstanding the ideas which he was propagating he handed out
one sample of the devices whose use he was endorsing." 49 Since
Emko foam is not "dangerous per se," Justice Douglas would have
found the First Amendment sufficient to dispose of the case. 150 The
most quotable quote from Douglas was: "The teachings of Baird
and those of Galileo might be of a different order; but the suppres-
sion of either is equally repugnant." 15 1
Ironically, those who suppressed and oppressed Galileo and
Baird were ideologically one and the same, the Roman Church.
The Roman Catholic Church still has not made great gains in ac-
cepting human liberty, gender equality, and privacy, preferring
authoritarian control instead. However, the Inquisition and bar-
bequing at the stake are not so popular today as before.
146. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 455 (Douglas J., concurring).
147. Editor's note: Due to the author's death, copies of these drafts could
not be located and verified prior to publication.
148. Though I am skeptical of anything Douglas wrote after 1965, his con-
curring opinion in Baird, in my view, is quite persuasive when studied care-
fully. His earlier Griswold opinion, however, may have so tarnished his
reputation as a writer of thoughtful well-reasoned material, that most Jus-
tices dismissed him by 1972 as a failing eccentric.
149. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 459 (Douglas J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 457-58.
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PATRICIAN POTTER STEWART AND THE FERTILE POOR
Justice Potter Stewart, the very likeable Yale Republican pa-
trician, did not write a separate opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
However, in a letter to Justice Brennan dated December 22, 1971,
he offered to concur, but subject to one startling condition:
The paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 13 of your
proposed opinion for the Court in this case gives me con-
siderable difficulty. If, as I understand from our tele-
phone conversation, you would be willing to delete that
paragraph, I would be glad to join your opinion. 152
The paragraph offensive to Stewart appeared on pages 13-14
in the December 13, 1971 circulated printed draft opinion by Jus-
tice Brennan. It stated:
This analysis points to an additional invidious dis-
crimination that the Massachusetts statute, viewed as a
health measure, effects, and that is the discrimination
against the poor. We have already taken judicial notice
that Emko vaginal foam is not a prescriptive drug .... By
authorizing only doctors and druggists on prescription to
dispense contraceptives, Massachusetts has, therefore,
unjustifiably made it impossible for those who cannot af-
ford the physician's fee to obtain contraceptives, regard-
less of their health needs. We conclude, accordingly, that
if §§ 21 and 21A are regarded as health measures, they
deny the unmarried and the poor the equal protection of
the laws.153
Justice Stewart would allow Justice Brennan to insert his
eloquent privacy dictum, but not this additional insert offered for
the poor and unmarried. 154 In Massachusetts, the poor could be
152. Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William Brennan (Dec.
22, 1971) (on file with Roger Williams University Law Review and available
at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division).
153. First draft of Supreme Court Opinion at 13-14, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-17) (citation omitted).
154. There appears to be no reference to this Stewart-Brennan exchange
in the Garrow book, Liberty and Sexuality, although the Brennan paragraph
could have been highly significant in economic discrimination cases of the fu-
ture. Stewart's seeming disdain for the poor showed its worst face in his 5-4
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forced to save up for a pointless physician's office visit to obtain a
prescription for Emko foam, even though such a ritual was re-
quired nowhere else in America and not considered remotely nec-
essary by the FDA. Justice Stewart was promoting unnecessary
physician office visits, welfare for doctors. The economic discrimi-
nation clause, however, was not necessary to the decision, because
the privacy argument independently invalidated the law.
Justice Brennan reluctantly deleted the paragraph on the
poor by the December 23, 1971 draft. The Eisenstadt v. Baird
opinion continued to gain supporters among the Justices, although
not from Justices Blackmun or White.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE WHITE
Justice Byron White, who also had written separately in
Griswold v. Connecticut,15 5 penned a concise, persuasive concur-
ring opinion with the same favorable result as that recommended
by Justice Brennan. Justice Blackmun joined that opinion on Feb-
ruary 29, 1972, instead of the privacy-oriented draft by Brennan.
White reasoned that:
Due regard for protecting constitutional rights requires
that the record contain evidence that a restriction on dis-
tribution of vaginal foam is essential to achieve the statu-
tory purpose, or the relevant facts concerning the product
must be such as to fall within the range of judicial notice.
Neither requirement is met here.'-%
The Commonwealth had not exactly put on the trial of the
century. They had not bothered to prove anything about the Emko
foam product or the still unknown person to whom it was or was
not handed, not even gender or marital status. Baird too had
failed to put on any evidence.
There are lessons to be learned here. In major cases involving
statewide laws, parties should plan ahead and consult with skilled
experienced counsel who can see the case from the Supreme Court
opinion for the Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), denying Medi-
caid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions.
155. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 464.
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perspective three years hence. Otherwise, they may seem unpre-
pared in the eyes of the all-important decision makers who make
the critical difference.
THE DISSENT AND DIATRIBE OF CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER
Warren Earl Burger became the Nixon-appointed Chief Jus-
tice in 1969 when his almost-namesake Earl Warren departed af-
ter the Abe Fortas debacle. 157 Burger had been a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia from 1956-1969. He
was Minnesota trained and had been a member of the Mayo
Foundation, attending board meetings and participating in the
growth of that respected medical institution. His Minnesota col-
league on the Court, Harry Blackmun, had been counsel for the
Mayo Clinic from 1950-1959. The two shared a certain respect for
medical professionals as a class. Many Supreme Court Justices
traveled to the Mayo Clinic for annual checkups, or for needed
treatment.
When Baird came up, Chief Burger previously had partici-
pated in only one major birth control or abortion case, United
States v. Vuitch.158 The Baird case struck Burger the wrong way.
He penned an undated five page handwritten memo of dissent and
sent it around to the other six Justices, all of whom ignored it. 159
For a start, the undated handwritten diatribe by Burger totally
misunderstood and maliciously insulted Bill Baird personally.
Burger called Baird names, such as "officious intermeddler,"
"common busybody," "quack," "mountebank," and "casual street
corner peddler."160 In fact, Baird had a pre-med background and
had been clinical director of Emko. He was and is an advocate of
wide access to birth control and abortion for humanitarian rea-
sons.
157. See Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: Symbol of the Warren Court?, in THE
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 155, 164 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1993).
158. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
159. Handwritten memorandum of dissent, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (No. 70-17). The full text of that memo is set out at the end of this
article. See Appendix. (Editor's note: Due to the author's death, this source
could not be located or verified prior to publication.)
160. Id.
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The Burger memo appears in the files of the other Justices. 161
None seems to have responded. Chief Justice Burger, apart from
mixing up the names of the parties, appears altogether to have
misunderstood the thrust and issues of the case. Burger alone
voted to reverse. Nowhere does he show any awareness that Bill
Baird was providing the nonprofit public service of informational
lectures on birth control, women's rights, population, poverty, and
more. The Emko foam, of course, could be bought by almost any-
one in the United States without prescription, and was not for sale
by Baird. He did not prescribe it or offer it to anyone to be used.
CONTINUING NATIONAL IMPACT OF EISENSTADT V. BAIRD
Some Supreme Court decisions affect only the parties to the
lawsuit, and thereafter seem to disappear forever. Others, such as
Roe v. Wade, are cited hundreds of times. Eisenstadt v. Baird has
been cited many hundreds of times. A basic www.FindLaw.com
search shows Baird mentioned in over 52 subsequent Supreme
Court cases from 1972 through December 2002. According to
Shepard's citator, each and every one of the eleven U.S. Court of
Appeals Circuits, as well as the Federal Circuit, has cited Eisen-
stadt v. Baird as authority. 162 Shepard's further reveals that Baird
has been cited by the highest courts of all 50 States, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, with the last being Mississippi in the
year 2000.163 Better late than never. Add to that the three columns
of law journal articles Shepard's has on Baird,64 and one must
acknowledge that the decision is among the most influential in the
United States during the entire century by any manner or means
of measurement.
161. This memo is included in the papers of Justice Brennan on file with
the Library of Congress and may be viewed with permission of the Brennan
estate. The William & Mary Law School in Williamsburg, Virginia, has the
Burger papers. However, Justice Burger ordered these sealed until Year
2026, a quarter of a century hence.
162. See supra note 143.
163. See supra note 144.
164. See supra note 145.
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THE BAIRD CASE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
While Baird in 1972 supplanted its timid older cousin Gris-
wold (completely in my view) and took some of the guesswork out
of predicting Roe/Doe, it also had an impact internationally in the
high courts of other English speaking nations.
A. Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada, in 1988, held the old Cana-
dian abortion law unconstitutional in Morgentaler v. The Queen.165
A paragraph from the opinion of Canadian Justice Wilson cites
Eisenstadt v. Baird as analogous and fairly applicable to this Ca-
nadian abortion law decision:
[T]he [U.S.] Supreme Court was asked to determine the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute forbidding the
use of contraceptives by married couples. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the majority held this statute to be invalid.
The judges writing for the majority used various constitu-
tional routes to arrive at this conclusion but the common
denominator seems to have been a profound concern over
the invasion of the marital home required for the en-
forcement of the law. Griswold was interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the later case of Eisenstadt v. Baird,
where the majority stated at p 453:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional make up. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.
In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachusetts law
165. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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that prohibited the distribution of any drug for the pur-
poses of contraception to unmarried persons on the
ground that it violated the equal protection clause. 166
And thus, the Morgentaler case legalized outpatient clinical
abortions across Canada, with a little help from Mr. Baird and his
case.
B. The United Kingdom
The British courts tend not to cite or rely upon American Su-
preme Court decisions, whether well-reasoned or not. We are not
their ancestors, and they cannot, therefore, engage in precedent
following and ancestor worship in the same manner as our own
common law judiciary. However, in the field of reproductive health
law, the British have far more efficiently faced many of the same
issues, including the Baird issue of providing contraceptives to
unmarried persons, and later to minors.
The leading House of Lords case of Mrs. Victoria Gillick v.
WN&WA Area Health Authority167 is one very American kind of
case and bears brief mention as a matter of comparative law
analogous to Eisenstadt v. Baird.
Mrs. Victoria Gillick, a proper English woman, sued the area
health authority to prevent their physicians from providing con-
traceptives to any of her four young daughters, all under the age
of sixteen, and a fifth who was born after suit was filed.168 There
was no suggestion that any daughter was actually seeking contra-
ceptives, or might do so without consulting Mom. However, Mom
was taking no chances that any daughter of hers might have sex
without fearing an unwanted pregnancy.
The case meandered its way up to the House of Lords where
on October 17, 1985 the Law Lords ruled thusly:
[A]s a matter of law the parental right to determine
whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will
have medical treatment terminates if and when the child
achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to
enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed. It
will be a question of fact whether a child seeking advice
166. Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
167. [1986] A.C. 112.
168. Id. at 119.
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has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give a
consent valid in law.169
The Law Lords in very short order decided what we Ameri-
cans would continue to litigate for twelve years from the arrest of
Bill Baird on April 6, 1967, through Eisenstadt v. Baird, to Baird
v. Bellotti (/),170 and not even ending altogether in Baird v. Bellotti
(II).171 Unmarried minors, even under the age of 16, could obtain
contraceptives in Britain if a doctor found them to have "sufficient
understanding and intelligence."172 There would be no wasteful
side court proceedings required of such minors, no vague burden-
some "judicial bypass" as our U.S. Supreme Court has required
and ordained.173 Scottish Law Lord Fraser of Tullybelton174 ob-
served that "[t]he only practicable course is to entrust the doctor
with a discretion to act in accordance with his view of what is best
in the interests of the girl who is his patient."175 His Lordship
found "nothing strange about entrusting them [doctors] with this
further responsibility, which they alone are in a position to dis-
charge satisfactorily."176
Strangeness consists of entrusting American state court trial
judges, instead of physicians, with that task.
C. Republic of Ireland
The independent ninety-five percent Roman Catholic Irish
Republic-the southern segment of the Emerald Isle-is a beauti-
ful geographic setting with castles, golf courses, leprechauns, and
a written constitution. Ireland has judicial review of parliamen-
tary legislation much the same as the United States, if you just
169. Id. at 188-89.
170. 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (raising, but not deciding, issue of mandatory pa-
rental consent in abortion context).
171. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (requiring judicial bypass procedures where pa-
rental consent for abortions is otherwise required by law).
172. Gillick, [1986] A.C. at 170.
173. Belotti (II), 443 U.S. at 643.
174. Tullybelton, Tayside, is in central Perth, Scotland, and has a town
website, http://www.geo.ed.ac.uk./scotgaz/towns/towndetails4750.html, which
reports that Tullybelton has 0 Attractions, 0 Families, 0 Features, 0 People,
and 2 Settlements, but a representative in the British House of Lords. There
is a nearby Loch, but it is monsterless at the present time.
175. Gillick, [1986] A.C. at 174.
176. Id.
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step back a few centuries. It also has an unborn right to life con-
stitutional amendment, enacted to forestall any potential Irish
version of Roe v. Wade. One can hope the Irish Justices do not
learn to use www.FindLaw.com and start quoting from the works
of Justice Antonin Scalia.
The Supreme Court of Ireland recognized and implemented a
constitutional right to marital privacy in Mary McGee v. The At-
torney General.177 Mary McGee was a 29-year-old married mother
of four. She lived happily with her fisherman husband in a cozy
trailer by the sea.178 She had had difficult pregnancies before, and
another would be seriously life threatening.179 She was fitted for a
diaphragm in Ireland. 80 The jelly, however, was only available
from England and had to pass through the watchful eyes of Irish
customsmen who were intent on seizing any such dangerous con-
traband. Her contraceptive jelly was seized upon its arrival by an
Irish customs special squadron.' 8 '
The McGee decision referred to American constitutional case
law, citing both Eisenstadt v. Baird and Griswold v. Connecticut
amongst the several opinions 8 2 and recognized an Irish right to
privacy. The right recognized was, in effect, the right of privacy of
a married woman to import and use contraceptives 8 3 Only Chief
Justice Fitzgerald dissented.18 4
I well recall receiving an overseas call sometime in 1972 from
an Irish solicitor asking the status of American birth control and
abortion cases he had read about in the International Herald
Tribune. He was Mary McGee's solicitor. I air-mailed him copies of
Griswold, Baird, and my gray brief for Roe in Roe v. Wade. That
was before fax or e-mail with attachments, much less
www.FindLaw.com.
177. [1974] I.R. 284 available at http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org
/pdf/co-eur ire-mcgee.pdf. (last visited November 22, 2003).
178. Id. at 318.
179. Id. at 314.
180. Id. at 303.
181. Id. at 314.
182. Id. at 305 (distinguishing both Griswold and Eisenstadt), 313 (ex-
plaining nonreliance on both Griswold and Eisenstadt), 317 (citing Griswold
with approval), 318 (citing Griswold with approval), 322 (citing Griswold
with approval).
183. Id. at 311.
184. Id. at 306.
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CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING E V. B, No. 70-17
Private notes circulated within the seven independent Su-
preme Court chambers labeled this case E v. B, No. 70-17.185 Un-
der the authorship of Justice William Brennan, it became one of
the most powerful right-of-privacy pronouncements ever issued by
the Supreme Court, at once a stealth judgment and decision of
profound and lasting impact. What started as a lecture at Boston
University on a sensitive subject of human rights importance, and
a medieval arrest by a boy's club of Irish cops, wound up creating
a new law of the land for unmarried persons, and a persuasive,
well-written precedent that could be used for the assertion of pri-
vacy rights from Maine to California, indeed from Vancouver to
Ottawa, and even in misty Dublin.
And so it was that Eisenstadt v. Baird came to pass. The plu-
rality opinion by Justice Brennan remains a masterpiece, more a
daVinci than a Van Gogh, with only Chief Justice Burger as a vi-
tuperative one-man Puritan-FDA in rabid dissent.
Bill Baird had slain the Massachusetts Jabberwock, until
the next one would come along.
185. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William Bren-
nan (Dec. 22, 1971) (on file with Roger Williams University Law Review and
available at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division); Letter from Jus-
tice Potter Stewart to Justice William Brennan (Dec. 22, 1971) (on file with
Roger Williams University Law Review and available at the Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division).
2003]
54 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol.9:9
APPENDIX
HANDWRITTEN MEMO OF CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER IN No. 70-17
(undated)1 86
[Explanations by the author in brackets.]
Eisenstadt 70-17
W E B (dissenting)
I dissent because I fail to understanding [sic] how the Petr
[Petitioner] had standing to challenge the statute or if he did why
the Mass holding is wrong.
Eisenstadt is what in times past was called an "officious in-
termeddler" or a "common busybody." [The Chief Justice has
mixed up Mr. Baird and Sheriff Eisenstadt]. The Court's opinion
points out that he was arrested while delivering what he called a
"lecture" and while delivering medicinal contraceptive materials
to a young woman student. The judgment of the Sup. Jud. Ct. of
Mass. in sustaining the conviction for the unlawful act of dispens-
ing the medicinal material without a license seems eminently cor-
rect to me and I would not disturb it. Again we need to remind
ourselves that we do not sit as a "court of errors" to review state
supreme courts. (Cite Harlan, J.).
That we dress our action in the trappings of constitutional ad-
judication does not alter what we are doing.
A state under its police power licenses and regulates doctors
and pharmacists for their respective functions. Petr is neither a
doctor nor a pharmacist. We can assume that one need not be a
doctor to sell or dispense the material here in question even
though it would seem quite clear that to prescribe it is an act of
practicing medicine.
Narrowing the focus to a selling or giving of such materials,
there are very good reasons why a state has a legitimate interest
in not allowing various and sundry quacks and mountebanks to
186. Editor's note: Due to the author's death, this memo, transcribed by
the author, was not provided to the Roger Williams University Law Review.
Consent to view the document was not received in time for publication.
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dispense, whether by sale or gift, medicinal materials. A licensed
pharmacist has a large stake in not dispensing a dangerous or
deleterious material: he may lose his valuable license and may be
subject to suit for injury. The casual street corner peddler - and
Eisenstadt is hardly more than this - has little at risk.
Mass in exercise of its undoubted police power has enacted a
statute governing dispensing of "any drug, medicine.., for the
prevention of conception" except by a physician or pharmacist. The
State's highest court has construed this statute to forbid the con-
duct engaged in by Petr as a layman. It is nonsense, of course, to
assert as he does, that the First Amend protects his right to pre-
scribe and dispense the medicinal material involved here. Surely
this construction of the statute is an adequate state ground to
support the conviction and binding on this Court.
That Petr gave the medicinal substance as a gift rather than
selling it is irrelevant. Whether this was a "come one" for some
other purpose we cannot know on this record, but his conduct is
hardly different from the quack "medicine man" of yester year who
came with horse and wagon and some crude form of entertain-
ment to attract the crowd and then give "free samples" of some
spurious potion. Police power has long since run such monte-
bank[s] out of business. We ought to let Mass treat its quacks in
the same way.
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